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I. INTRODUCTION

Voltaire once said, "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the
death your right to say it."' Many would place this philosophy at the heart
of American free speech doctrine. Nevertheless, for equality's sake, support
* B.S. 1982, United States Naval Academy; candidate for J.D., May 1995, University of
South Carolina. The author would like to thank Professor Thomas R. Haggard for his invaluable
assistance in the creation of this article. His patience knew no bounds.
1. THE OxFoRD DIcrIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 717 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992).
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for the principle is waning. To proscribe hostile work environments pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 our legal system has constructed
a doctrine that will severely test the First Amendment.3
This Note examines the First Amendment implications of hostile
environment law. 4 Part II examines the origin and development of the hostile
environment theory. Part III evaluates the standing and state action requirements in hostile environment situations. Finally, Part IV analyzes the hostile
environment theory under various First Amendment doctrines.
II.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF TITLE VII'S
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT THEORY

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating "against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. "I Although the statute does not expressly proscribe discriminatory
6 harassment, the courts eventually held that such behavior violates Title
VII.

The statute's "because of" language supports these holdings. Harassment
of a female employee because of poor work performance is not actionable.
However, Title VII prohibits harassment of an employee because she is
female. Thus, if the employer would not have harassed a poorly performing
male in the same circumstances, the employer has discriminated by harassing
the female.
In 1980 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
promulgated sexual harassment guidelines. 7 In 1982 the Eleventh Circuit

2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. This Note focuses primarily on sexually hostile environments. However, because of the
common origins of the various hostile environments, the same principles also apply to other forms
of harassment. Cf. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (relying on cases
prohibiting harassment based on race, religion, and national origin to expand the scope of Title
VII to prohibit sexual harassment).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
6. See, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977)
(national origin); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1971) (race), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 957 (1972); Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp 1050, 1056 (E.D. Va. 1984)
(religion). In early sexual harassment cases, judges often held that Title VII did not apply to
sexually harassing behavior. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp.
553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F.
Supp. 233, 235-36 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Come v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 162-63 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
7. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980). The guidelines provide in part:

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss3/5

2

Sullivan: Covenants Not to Compete and Liquidated Damages Clauses: Diagnosi

1995]

HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

indicated its approval of these guidelines in Henson v. City of Dundee.8 The
court acknowledged the two forms of sexual harassment: "quid pro quo" and
"hostile environment."'
Quid pro quo harassment occurs when an employer conditions a job
benefit or detriment on whether an employee submits to sex with the
employer.10 The male employer who fires a female employee for rebuffing
his sexual advances commits a quid pro quo violation.II

Few free speech concerns arise from quid pro quo harassment.

The

12
behavior is extortion and should receive no First Amendment protection.
Unlike quid pro quo actions, hostile environment claims do not require
a demand for sex in return for favorable job treatment. 13 Instead, the hostile
environment theory treats the work climate as a condition of employment. 4

(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an .individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1994) (footnote omitted).
8. 682 F.2d 897, 903 & n.7 (11th Cir. 1982); cf. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65 ("As
an 'administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency,' [EEOC] Guidelines, 'while
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience
and informed judgement to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.'"
(quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (stating that EEOC guidelines "are 'entitled to great
deference'") (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34) (citation omitted)).
9. Henson, 682 F.2d at 908 n.18 (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32-47 (1979); Herna H. Kay & Carroll M. Bradsky, Bank
Review ProtectingWomen from Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 58 TEXAS L. REV. 671

(1980).
10. E.g., Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d. 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
In quid pro quo actions, employers are held strictly liable for a supervisor's actions. E.g.,
Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir.) (citing Highlander v. K.F.C.
Nat'l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986)), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 831 (1992).
11. See Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 783 (1st Cir. 1990).
12. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW 592-93 (1992).
13. Quid pro quo demands can create a hostile environment. If a harasser threatens a job
detriment with a demand for sex, but then fails to carry out the threat once the victim refuses to
comply, a hostile environment will arise. Cf. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568
F.2d 1044, 1046 n.1 (3d Cir. 1977) (acknowledging plaintiff's alternate theory of hostile
environment, but finding it unnecessary to pass on its merits).
14. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); cf. Harris v. Forklift
Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371-72 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (acknowledging that Meritordefined
the work environment as a condition of employment).
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Employers may not discriminate in a condition of employment because of
sex."5 Therefore, any detrimental alteration in an employee's work environment because of gender violates Title VII.
The United States Supreme Court upheld Title VII hostile environment
claims in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 6 The Court noted a racial
discrimination case as the origin of the theory 17 and then equated sexual and
racial harassment:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return
for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living 18can be as
demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.
Next, the Court defined an actionable hostile environment. To violate
Title VII, the sexual harassment "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment.' 9

15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988); see Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (1993).
16. 477 U.S. at 66 (1986).
17. In Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972),
the Fifth Circuit held that Title VII may proscribe a hospital's practice of racially segregating
patients. The court allowed an EEOC investigation to continue in order to determine if the
practice created a work environment racially hostile to minority employees. Id. at 240-41.
Before 1980, one court discussed the concept of a sexually hostile environment, but did not reach
the merits of the claim. See Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1046 n. 1. After the EEOC promulgated its
sexual harassment guidelines, see supra note 7 and accompanying text, the theory surfaced in the
lower federal courts. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901-04 (11th Cir.
1982).
18. Meritor,477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 902). The Court also noted with
approval hostile environment claims based on national origin and religion. Id. at 66 (citing
Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977); Compston v. Borden,
Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976)).
19. Id. at 67 (alteration in original) (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). The Court also
provided other guidance. First, a plaintiff's consensual sex with an alleged harasser does not
shield the employer from liability. See id. at 68. The heart of a sexual harassment claim is that
the harassed employee found the alleged sexual advances "unwelcome." Id. (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a) (1985)). The finder of fact must inquire whether an employee's conduct indicates
that the sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether the participation in sex was voluntary.
Id.
Second, the Court addressed, but refused to establish, definitive employer liability
standards. Id. at 72. The Court stated that "courts [are] to look to agency principles for
guidance in this area." Id. The Court noted that some common-law agency principles may not
transfer neatly into the Title VII hostile environment analysis. Id. In addition, a sexual
harassment grievance procedure left unused by the victim does not per se insulate an employer
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The federal circuits developed various hostile environment tests." The
basic analysis examines for objective and subjective harm, "considering the
likely effect of a defendant's conduct upon a reasonable person's ability to
perform his or her work and upon his or her well-being, as well as the actual
effect upon the particular plaintiff bringing the claim."2
Recently, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,' the Supreme Court
resolved a circuit court split over the level of harm that can create a hostile
environment.1 Some courts demanded that a plaintiff receive a severe

from liability. Id. at 72-73. Finally, the court rejected strict employer liability for the
harassment. See id. at 72 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219-237 (1958)).
20. See, e.g., Boutros v. Canton Regional Transit Auth., 997 F.2d 198, 203 (6th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987)); Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing
Staton v. Maries County, 868 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1989)); Collins v. Baptist Memorial Geriatric
Ctr., 937 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1987)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 968 (1992); cf. Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th
Cir. 1987) (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-04); Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982);
EEOC v. Horizons Hotel Corp., 831 F. Supp. 10, 14 (D.P.R. 1993) (citing Meritor, 477 U.S.
at 66-73).
The Third Circuit formulated its test in Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir.
1990): "(1) the employees suffered intentional discrimination because of their sex; (2) the
discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the
plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex
in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability." Id. at 1482 (citing
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619-20) (footnote omitted).
To attach respondeat superior liability, the plaintiff "must show that the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment ... and failed to take prompt remedial action." Henson,
682 F.2d at 905 (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Vinson v. Taylor,
23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd,753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd,
477 U.S. 57 (1986)). For a review of the employer liability issue, see Maria M. Carillo, Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Under Title VII: Reassessment of Employer
Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41 (1992-93);
Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual HarassmentLiability Under Agency Principles: A Second
Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1229 (1991).
21. Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1271-72 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Brooms
v. Regal Tube Co, 881 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1989); cf. e.g., Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482
(using a reasonable woman rather than a reasonable person standard); 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266,
51,267 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609) (proposed Oct. 1, 1993) (providing that
consideration shall be given to the victim's perspective when determining whether the reasonable
person standard has been met). The reasonable woman standard has generated much discussion.
See, e.g., Robert S. Adler& Ellen R. Peirce, The Legal, Ethical,and SocialImplicationsof the
"ReasonableWomen" Standardin Sexual HarassmentCases, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 773 (1993);
Sarah A. DeCosse, Simply Unbelievable: Reasonable Women and Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment, 10 LAW & INEQ. J. 285 (1992); Cheryl L. Dragel, Note, Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment: Should the Ninth Circuit's "ReasonableWoman" StandardBeAdopted?, 11
J.L. & COM. 237 (1992).
22. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
23. Id. at 370.
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psychological injury.24 Others required an unreasonable interference with the
plaintiff's work.'
The Court resolved the conflict by taking "a middle path between making
actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to
cause a tangible psychological injury."2 6 Justice O'Connor wrote for the
Court in holding that an employer violates Title VII "[w]hen the workplace is
permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' that is
'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive work environment.'"27
After Harris,a sexually abusive environment that does not interfere with
a plaintiff's work may nevertheless serve as the basis for a hostile work
environment claim.28 Justice O'Connor said:
A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not
seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can and often will
detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees from
remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers.
Moreover, even without regardto these tangible effects, the very fact that
the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a
work environment abusive to employees because of
their... gender ... offends Title VlI's broad rule of workplace
equality.

29

Thus, a hostile environment can occur without any tangible effect on the
plaintiff.
Justice Scalia acknowledged, "Accepting Meritor'sinterpretation [that the
work environment is a condition of employment] as the law, the test is not
whether work has been impaired, but whether worldng conditions have been
discriminatorily altered. "'

24. See, e.g., Brooms, 881 F.2d at 418-19; Rabidue v. OsceolaRef. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619
(6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
25. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 n.8 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ellisondecision
also addressed the issue of the reasonable woman standard. See id. at 878-81.
26. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370. The employer, Forklift Systems, Inc., argued the First
Amendment against adopting a merely offensive standard of harm. Brief for Respondent, 1993
WL 302223, at *50-*51 (June 1, 1993). Although the Court did not discuss the First Amendment
concern, it did reject the merely offensive standard. See Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
27. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Mentor Say.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)).
28. See id. at 371.
29. Id. at 370-71 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring). But cf. id. at 372 (Ginsberg, J., concurring) ("[T]he
adjudicator's inquiry should center, dominantly, on whether the discriminatory conduct has
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance." (emphasis added)).
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Hostile environment cases require a "totality of the circumstances"
analysis. The finder of fact must consider "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or
a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance."31
In addition, the Court retained the
objective and subjective standards of harm.32
The First Amendment has not fared well in hostile environment cases.
Courts often fail to address apparent First Amendment issues.33 Even when
discussed, the First Amendment analysis is sparse.34 The following cases
present a few examples.
Courts often use their coercive power to suppress views found repugnant
by the court. In Stair v. Lehigh Valley CarpentersLocal Union No. 6065 a
federal court enjoined a union for creating a sexually hostile work environment.36 The union purchased and distributed calendars containing pictures
of nude women. The calendars also were posted at work sites. The calendars
humiliated and embarrassed the plaintiff and affected her ability to communicate on the job.37 The court defined the calendars as per se evidence of

31. Id. at 371.
32. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 ("Conductthat [does not] create an objectively hostile or abusive
work environment . . . is beyond Title VIl's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive,. . . there is no Title VII violation."). The
Supreme Court did not explicitly address the standard of the reasonable woman. The majority and
both concurring opinions consistently referred to the "reasonable person," see id. at 370-72,
except when quoting the district court. See id. at 369-70 ("The court found that some of Hardy's
comments 'offended [Harris], and would offend the reasonable woman ....
A reasonable
woman managerunder like circumstanceswould have been offended by Hardy ... .'" (emphasis
added) (citations omitted) (alteration in original)). In not addressing the district court's use of
the reasonable woman standard, the Supreme Court may implicitly agree with the reasonable
woman rule. Conversely, the Court's express use of reasonable person implies acceptance of the
reasonable person option. Thus, the issue remains unresolved.
33. See, e.g., Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 42,602 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aft'd, No. 93-1738 (3d Cir. Nov. 7, 1994).
34. See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 884 n.89 (D. Minn. 1993).
35. 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,602.
36. See id. at 77,270. Title VII also applies to unions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1988)
("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization- (1) to ... discriminate
against, any individual because of his ... sex. .. ").
37. Stair, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,602, at 77,267-68.
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intentional discrimination." The court then held that the calendars created
a hostile environment.39
The court attacked the union's views with its holding. First, the judge
emphasized that the calendar's expressive content "'conveys the message that
[women] do not belong, that they are welcome in the workplace only if they
will subvert their identities to the sexual stereotypes prevalent in the
environment. That Title VII outlaws such conduct is beyond peradventure.'"' Thus the judge subtly, and without First Amendment discussion,
characterized the calendar's message as conduct. Faced with conduct instead
of speech, the court then enjoined the hostile environment.4 '
42
The court's injunction directly suppressed the union's expression.
However, the injunction did not expressly prohibit the printing or publication
of the calendars.43 Perhaps the court recognized the First Amendment furor
that awaited a prior restraint. 44 But the judge effectively imposed that
restraint. The judge noted the calendar as the only evidence of a hostile
environment and then enjoined that environment. The union had the choice
to either discontinue publishing the calendars or violate the injunction. This
choice constructively created a prior restraint.

38. See id. at 77,267-68 ("The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving
pornographic materials is 'implicit' and courts should recognize this 'as a matter of course.'")
(quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990)). Andrews is
distinguishable. In Andrews the Third Circuit Court of Appeals defined posted pornography as
intentionally discriminatory. See 895 F.2d at 1482 n.3. The court also based its decision on other
harassing conduct. See id. at 1486. In Stair the calendars provided the only proof of a hostile
environment. See 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,602, at 77,267-69.
39. See Stair, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,602, at 77,269.
40. Id. at 77,268 (emphasis added) (quoting Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp.
1486, 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
41. See id. at 77,270. The injunction in Stair also forced the union to adopt a sexual
harassment policy. Id.
42. The judge pointed out that "[t]he presence of ...pornographic calendars detrimentally
affected the plaintiff." See id. at 77,268. The union argued that local stores sold more graphic
pictures. Id.
43. See id. at 77,270.
44. Cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) ("[P]rior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights."); McLaughlinv. New York, 784 F. Supp. 961, 977 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) ("In ...arguing
[for relief in the form of a prior restraint], plaintiff asks the court to ignore the overwhelming
precedent militating against imposition of such 'gag orders.'" (citations omitted)); State v. I, A
Women-Part II, 191 N.W.2d 897, 902-03 (Wis. 1971) ("[Aln invalid prior restraint is an
infringement upon the constitutional right to disseminate matters that are ordinarily protected by
the first amendment without there first being a judicial determination that the material does not
qualify for first-amendment protection." (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931))).
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In addition, the judge forced the union to adopt the government's
viewpoint on sexist ideas. The court required the union to adopt a sexual
harassment policy and to provide education about sexual harassment and the
union's policy for union members.45 The pornographic calendars were the
only discriminatory conduct. Therefore, the court's demand for training forces
the union to express the government's view on pornography.
Even when courts recognize a First Amendment issue, the analysis often
is sparse. In Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co.' a class of female mine
workers prevailed on a sexual harassment hostile environment claim. The
court found as dispositive some posted pornographic materials, verbal and
physical conduct, and the stereotypical views expressed by male employees.4 7
Although the court acknowledged the workers's right to hold those views, the
opinion emphasized the illegality of expressing those beliefs in the workplace.4" The court then tersely addressed the First Amendment. The court
recognized that an expression may be "swept up" in the illegal conduct; thus,
no First Amendment violation would exist.49 The discussion was limited to
a footnote.5 0
One court has acknowledged that the First Amendment may have more
than a peripheral impact on hostile environment claims, especially those based
on pure speech. In a case involving an allegedly sexually hostile environment
created by male members of a union picket line, a New Jersey appellate court
clearly confronted the free-speech issue.5 Although upholding the trial
court's refusal to grant the union summary judgment on the hostile environment issue, the appellate court recognized that "the parties will have to deal
with a difficult legal issue . . . . Because the acts of harassment which the
plaintiffs allege were solely verbal, this case requires the resolution of an
apparent conflict between [the hostile environment theory] and the free speech
guaranty of the First Amendment."52
45. Stair, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)

42,602, at 77,270.

46. 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993).
47. See id. at 879-83. The court noted that an absence of expert testimony on stereotypes
would not have changed the result. See id. at 882-83.
48. See id. at 884 n.89; see also Parton v. GTE North, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 241, 252 (W.D.
Mo. 1991) (listing evidence of sexual harassment and noting separately the expressed bias of the
plaintiff's supervisor), aff'd, 971 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1992).
49. See Jenson, 824 F. Supp. at 884 n.89 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112
S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992)). But see Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp.
1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ("The County is, of course, free to proscribe offensive behavior or
language which may result from the 'sex-role stereotyping.' Nevertheless, the County may not
proscribe the communication of 'sex-role stereotyping' simply because it disagrees with the
message.").

50. See id.
51. Baliko v. Stecker, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 899, 903 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1994).
52. Id. (declining to further address the free speech question because of the lack of a factual
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III. STANDING, STATE ACTION, AND FIRST AMENDMENT
CLAIMS IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SITUATIONS

When employee speech creates a hostile environment, the employer's
standing to assert the employee's First Amendment rights is an issue. 3 In
addition, the First Amendment potentially applies if an employer suppresses
speech and if the employees claim First Amendment protection. Then, the
issue is whether the employer who suppressed the speech was a "state
actor."54

A. Pleading Employee Free Speech Rights
as a Defense to a Hostile Environment Claim
When employee speech creates a hostile environment, employers have
standing to assert a First Amendment defense. The "standing to sue" doctrine
requires that a party advancing a claim has sufficient stake in the outcome to
warrant judicial resolution.55 The issue addresses the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to hear the case. 6 The party asserting standing must satisfy
constitutional and prudential requirements.5 7
The Supreme Court has provided three constitutional limits. 58 "First,
the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact .....
.".1 Second, a causal
connection between the injury and the challenged conduct must exist.'

record on the issue).
53. If the employer's own speech creates the hostile environment, the employer has standing
to assert a First Amendment defense. Cf. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp.
1486, 1534 (M.D. Fla. 1991) ("No First Amendment concern arises when the employer has no
intention to express itself ... ." (citing EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599
(S.D.N.Y.1981)).
54. State action exists, by definition, if the government is the employer. Cf. Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383-84 (1987) (recognizing that in the context of a § 1983 action, "a
State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that employee's constitutionally
protected interest in freedom of speech") (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972));
Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (enjoining
fire department's ban on reading of Playboy in fire station).
55. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)).
56. Weiner v. Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F. Supp. 684, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
57. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
58. These limits arise from the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the
Constitution. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (citing Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)).
59. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (citingAllen, 468 U.S. at 756; Warth, 422 U.S. at 508; Sierra
Club, 405 U.S. at 740-41 n.16).
60. Id. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
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Finally, a favorable decision must "likely," as opposed to speculatively,
redress the injury."
In a hostile environment suit, the employer will satisfy the constitutional
criteria for standing. First, the employer will suffer an injury in fact. An
injury in fact is "an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) 'actual or imminent.'"62 If an injunction
bans a hostile environment, but also violates the First Amendment, compliance
with the order illegally injures the employer. To comply, the employer must
establish policies, provide training, and monitor results. Damage awards also
cause injury. Thus, a court decision that violates the First Amendment
invades the employer's legal interest in company assets.
Second, the conduct the employer complains of is causally connected to
the injury. The party asserting standing must identify a nexus between his
injury and the challenged conduct of the opposing party.63 The injury must
not be "'th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before
the court.'"'
If employees create a hostile environment, the court may
enjoin the defendant-employer and award damages. If the court finds for a
plaintiff over the employer's valid First Amendment defense, the court and the
plaintiff-employee injure the employer. Thus, the parties that cause the injury
are before the court.
The employer will satisfy the final constitutional requirement. The relief
provided by a favorable decision will likely, as opposed to speculatively,
remedy the alleged injury of the party asserting standing. If the court allows
the employer to assert successfully a First Amendment defense to a hostile
environment claim, no liability attaches, and the employer will suffer no
injury.'
The employer also will overcome the nonconstitutional restrictions on
standing. In Warth v. Seldin' the Supreme Court provided two prudential
limits:
First .... when the asserted harm is a "generalized grievance" shared in
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm
alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction. Second, even
when the plaintiff has alleged [sufficient injury], this Court has held that
the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and

61. Id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
62. Id. (citations omitted).
63. See Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42).
64. Id. at 2136 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43 (alteration in original)).
65. The imposition of hostile environment liability is not the disputed conduct. The employer
complains of hostile environment liability imposed in violation of the FirstAmendment.
66. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third
parties. 67
The generalized grievance restriction is not an issue. The employer does not
share his injury with anyone.
The prohibition against third-party standing presents a larger obstacle.
When a party asserts a third party's right, standing becomes more difficult to
establish.68 The employer who asserts an employee's First Amendment right
69
is not subject to the government's suppression of speech; the employee is.
Thus, the third-party limitation apparently precludes standing.
Nonetheless, the courts have jurisdiction to hear the employer's defense
because hostile environment liability indirectly violates employees' First
Amendment rights. The Supreme Court permits "standing to litigate the rights
of third parties when enforcement of the challenged restriction against the
litigant would result indirectly in the violation of the third parties' rights." 7"
If a court finds a hostile environment, the employer must suppress the
harassing speech of coworkers. If the employer does not, additional liability
likely will accrue through contempt proceedings or further hostile environment
litigation. Thus, the government indirectly suppresses employee speech,
giving the employer standing to assert the employee's First Amendment rights.
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards7' a United States district court in

Florida did not agree. The court issued an injunction against an employer who
asserted a First Amendment defense. 72 The judge emphasized that the
employer neither expressed the disputed language nor adopted the speech as

its own.73
67. Id. at 499 (citations omitted).
68. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2137 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984); Simon, 426
U.S. at 44-45; Warth, 422 U.S. at 505).
69. But see infranotes 73, 207 and 208 and accompanying text (suggesting that governmental
coercion forcing an employer to suppress employee speech constitutes a direct violation of
employer speech rights).
70. Warth, 422 U.S. at 510 (citing Doe v. Bolton 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Griswold v,
Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953)). The remaining
third-party exceptions do not readily apply to the employer who asserts employee speech rights.
See id.
71. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
72. See id. at 1534-37 (stating that "[t]he first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech
does not impede the remedy of injunctive relief" but conducting no First Amendment analysis).
73. See id. at 1534 (citing EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 610 & n.17
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)). Compare Robinson with Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship:
Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 481 (1991).
Professor Browne, drawing on Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), states that regardless
of whether the employer is speaking or adopts the speech of the co-workers, the employer is
actually pleading its own First Amendment right: "The government may no more compel a
person to censor the protected speech of those over whom he has control on the ground that the
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Another federal court did not follow Robinson on this issue. In Jenson
v. Eveleth Taconite Co. 4 the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota implicitly found standing for the employer. In response to a First
Amendment defense based on employee speech, the court recognized that the
Constitution permits governmental suppression of workplace speech through
Title VII.75 By thus addressing the First Amendment issue, the court tacitly
acknowledged employer standing.
B. FirstAmendment Claims Against Employers
If an employer suppresses workplace speech to prevent a hostile
environment, the workers may possibly assert a First Amendment claim
against the employer. "State action" becomes an issue if the employer is a
private entity. If the employee works for the government, the state action
issue disappears, and other concerns arise. 6
Normally, private employees receive no First Amendment protection for
their workplace speech. A private employer is not the government, and the
government must suppress the speech before the First Amendment will
apply.'
Under certain circumstances, however, state involvement so
permeates private action that the private party becomes a state actor and the
constitutional limits apply.78

government finds it offensive, than the government may compel a person to express a message
that he chooses not to express." Browne, supra at 511-12.
74. 824 F. Supp 847 (D. Minn. 1993).
75. See id. at 884 n.89.
76. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text (discussing the public employee speech
doctrine).
77. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) ("It is, of course, a commonplace that the
constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government,
federal or state.") (citing CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)).
78. See, e.g., Andrews v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 998 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1993).
State action occurs under four theories:
(1) when the state has coerced the private actor to commit an act that would be
unconstitutional if done by the state [(the coercion theory)]; (2) when the state has
sought to evade a clear constitutional duty through delegation to a private actor [(the
delegation theory)]; (3) when the state has delegated a traditionally and exclusively
public function to a private actor [(the public functions theory)]; or (4) when the state
has committed an unconstitutional act in the course of enforcing a right of a private
citizen [(the government intervention theory)].
Id. The final three theories do not readily apply in the private-employee speech context.
The government intervention theory raises an interesting question, however. State action
occurs with government intervention if the government commits an unconstitutional act while
enforcing a private citizen's right. Id. In addition, the private party "may be held accountable
for invoking the state's authority." Id. at 219. If a district court enjoins workplace speech in
violation of the First Amendment, the government commits an unconstitutional act. Does an
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The employer who suppresses workplace speech in response to a court
order becomes a state actor. If the state commands a particular result, it
reserves the power to decide the outcome and removes the decision from the
realm of private choice. 9 Clearly, an injunction or damage award that forces
an employer to limit workplace speech is an act of governmental coercion."0
The employer must either comply or face further penalty."

employee with suppressed speech now have a cause of action against the harassed employee
whose suit caused the First Amendment violation? The harassed employee invoked the state's
authority to enforce an individual right to a discrimination-free environment. Cf. Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941-42 (1982) (holding that a joint action between a private
party and the state that violates due process of law gives rise to a civil rights action against the
private party).
79. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963) (stating the "coercion" theory
of state action).
80. Cf. Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600, 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
42,602 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (enjoining union to adopt sexual harassment policy and to avoid
creating hostile environment), aff'd, No. 93-1738 (3d Cir. Nov. 7, 1994); Jenson v. Eveleth
Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 888-89 (D. Minn. 1993) (requiring the employer to adopt a
sexual harassment policy); Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, 809 F. Supp. 922, 933 (M.D. Ala.
1992) (compelling employer to adopt policies and procedures to rid the workplace of its sexually
hostile environment); Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 785 F. Supp. 760, 766-67 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (allowing employer to avoid hostile environment liability because employer transferred
alleged harasser), aft'd, 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993); Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767
F. Supp. 1205, 1213-14 (D.R.I. 1991) (requiring employer "to designate an officer... to
receive and process sexual harassment complaints"); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.
Supp. 1486, 1537 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (requiring the shipyard "to adopt, implement, and enforce
a policy and procedures for the prevention and control of sexual harassment"). The coercive
power of the government is aptly demonstrated as well by a court's power to grant attorney's
fees. See Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600, 64 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
43,032 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (awarding plaintiffs $74,000 in fees on hostile environment claim based
on union calendars even though plaintiff failed to carry any other claim of specific intentional
harassment).
81. One commentator suggests that the state-action doctrine in conjunction with employment
at will gives the government the power to suppress workplace speech. See Amy Horton,
Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First
Amendment, and the Contours of Title WI, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 403, 419 (1991). The
comment asserts without analysis that the state action doctrine removes any First Amendment
concern for workplace speech. The comment argues that the employment-at-will doctrine, thus,
effectively enables the employer to regulate workplace speech with the threat of dismissal to
employees who do not comply. Id. Therefore, because the employer can constitutionally
suppress workplace speech, the government may in turn constitutionally coerce the employer into
the suppression. See id. at 432 ("The mandate of Title VII to eradicate discrimination simply
takes precedence over an employee's individual right to free expression-which is, in any case,
virtually non-existent. . . ."). This reasoning attempts to cloak the government with the private
character of the employer. The federal government has attempted similar devices before and
failed. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614-16 (1989)
(rejecting contention that private drug testing of train crews shielded governmental regulations
supporting the tests from Fourth Amendment review; stating "that the Government did more than
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The government also acts through the employer who preemptively
restricts employee speech to avoid Title VII liability. Courts often force
employers who lose hostile environment suits to establish sexual harassment
policies.' This judicial response strongly suggests that employers without
plans eventually will face and lose a hostile environment suit.8" The fear of
liability undoubtedly will affect employers. First, careful employers probably
will establish strong antiharassment policies. Second, managers likely will
overreact to marginally offensive speech.
These effects will combine to suppress speech on the job. A male worker
may strongly believe that the increasing number of working women severely
harms American society. On coffee breaks, the male chauvinist delivers an
expletive-laden tirade, and asserts ideas such as, "Women belong in the
bedroom, not the boardroom." Employers with strong sexual harassment
policies would quickly quash this employee's speech. Even if the employee
presented the same message without creating a hostile environment, the
employer likely would respond to the complaints of female coworkers because
the potential monetary losses are too great. Thus, the hostile environment
theory suppresses more than grossly sexist language; the doctrine also chills
milder, potentially nonhostile expressions of the same viewpoint.
The case for governmental coercion weakens if an employer restricts
workplace speech for some reason other than Title VII. The Supreme Court
has stated, "It would intolerably broaden ... the notion of state action...
to hold that the mere existence of a ...law in a State, whether decisional or
statutory, itself amounted to 'state action' even though no state process or state
officials were ever involved in enforcing that body of law.""
Some
employers would limit discriminatory speech even if Title VII did not exist.
Altruistic concerns, morale problems, or other motives might compel the
employer's actions. Nevertheless, proof of an alternate motive is difficult, and
the difficulty magnifies if the employer follows a policy that closely resembles
antidiscriminatory plans created in response to Title VII.
As the discussions of standing and state action demonstrate, hostile
environment liability places employers in a tenuous position. On one hand,
standing principles will allow the employer to assert the First Amendment
rights of employees as a defense. On the other hand, the same First
Amendment right may result in liability through the state action doctrine if the
employer suppresses speech because of Title VII.

adopt a passive position toward the underlying private conduct").
82. See supra note 80.
83. The mere presence of a plan however is not a per se defense. See supra note 19.
84. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160 n.10 (1978).
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IV. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
OF THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

Hostile environment law developed with little concern for the First
Amendment.'
Many decisions appear suspect on First Amendment
grounds.8 6 Even when courts acknowledge the free speech issue, they give
it cursory treatment.'
The issue has, however, generated much academic
debate.88
One judge acknowledged the constitutional challenge to the hostile
environment and provided a perspective for addressing the issue:
We may one day conclude that some workplace speech-for instance,
a bigoted political poster-is protected even if it creates a hostile work

environment. .

.

. [S]urely the right answer is to save as much of

workplace harassment law as we can, not to throw it all out just because
a few courts, not faced with First Amendment defenses, may have read it
too broadly. 9

Judge Kozinski's position contains two underlying propositions. First, the
judge recognizes that the hostile environment requires First Amendment
review. Second, the judge indicates that the hostile environment probably
proscribes the expression of sexist political views.
85. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285, 1296 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
86. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Tunis v. Coming Glass Works, 747 F. Supp. 951
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1991); Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F. Supp. 521
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aft'd, 782 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1986)).
87. See ScandinavianHealth Spa, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 581 N.E.2d 1169, 1177
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (refuting without analysis appellant's First Amendment defense, reasoning
that because Title VII creates a right to be free from a hostile work environment, verbal sexual
abuse "does not constitute protected speech under these circumstances."); Jenson v. Eveleth
Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 884 n.89 (D. Minn. 1993) ("Eveleth Mines fails to
acknowledge that Title VII . . . is concerned with regulating the work place, not society
generally. As a result, acts of expression which may not be proscribed if they occur outside of
the work place may be prohibited if they occur at work.").
88. See, generallyLINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 12, at 592-600; Adler & Pierce, supra
note 21; Browne, supra note 73; Jules B. Gerard, The FirstAmendment in a HostileEnvironment:
A Primeron FreeSpeech and Sexual Harassment,68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003 (1993); Marcy
Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1990); Nadine
Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the First Amendment-Avoiding a Collision, 37 VILL. L. REv. 757 (1992); Stacy J. Cooper, Sexual Harassment
andthe Swedish Bikini Team: A Reevaluationof the "HostileEnvironment"Doctrine,26 CoLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 387 (1993); Amy Horton, Comment, supra note 79; Eugene Volokh,
Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment,39 UCLA L. REv. 1791 (1992).
89. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1296 n.7 (Kozinski, J., dissenting), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 464
(1994).
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The Supreme Court has not addressed the First Amendment in a hostile
This Part analyzes various First Amendment
environment context.'
doctrines that may arise. 9'

A. Conduct, Expressive Conduct, or Speech?
Courts often justify a suppression of speech by classifying the speech or
message as conduct or expressive conduct.' Judges in hostile environment
cases follow this pattern as they presumptively define expressions of bias as
conduct. 93 Expressive conduct receives less constitutional protection than pure
9
speech, and conduct that lacks expression receives no protection at all.
Therefore, the distinctions between conduct, expressive conduct, and pure
speech are critical.
To receive First Amendment protection, conduct must contain a sufficient
element of communication. 5 The Supreme Court looks for an intent to

90. Cf. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (reiterating that the First
Amendment does not protect a freedom to associate in a discriminatory manner).
91. The analysis that follows focuses primarily on speech not contained in a per se prohibited
category of speech. For a discussion of the application of these categories to workplace speech,
see Gerard, supra note 86; Strauss, supra note 86.
92. See, e.g., Wisconsinv. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194,2201 (1993) ("mhe statute in this case
is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment."); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
403 (1989) ("We must first determine whether [the conduct] constituted expressive conduct,
permitting [invocationof] the First Amendment .... "); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
376 (1968) ("We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea.").
93. See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp 847, 884 n.89 (D. Minn. 1993)
("In this way, Title VII may legitimately proscribe conduct ... which creates[s] an offensive
working environment."); Cf. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200 ("[R]ecently, in St. Paul], we cited
Title VII ... as an example of a permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct."); R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992) (describing Title VII as a statute targeting
conduct). The EEOC makes the same presumption:
Harassment is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or
aversion toward an individual because of his/her [protected status].
Harassing conduct includes... [wirittenor graphicmaterial that denigrates or
shows hostility or aversion toward an individual or group because of race, color,
religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability and that is placed on walls,
bulletin boards, or elsewhere on the employer's premises, or circulated in the
workplace.
58 FED. REG. 51,266, 51,269 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1609) (proposed Oct. 1,
1993) (emphasis added).
94. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404, 406-07.
95. See id. at 404. The Supreme Court places the burden of demonstrating the expressive
element of the conduct on the party claiming the First Amendment violation. Clark v.
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convey a particularized message and a great likelihood that the message is
understandable. 9" In addition, the context of the conduct is important. 9
Courts find expression in many forms of behavior.98
Discriminatory behavior can range from pure conduct to pure speech. An
employer may post a political flyer for a candidate with a "Women Belong in
the Home" platform. The flyer contains pictures of seminude women. This
action potentially creates an environment hostile to a woman. 9 If the bigoted
poster contained no expression and, thus, was only conduct, the Constitution

would not apply."ot

Calling speech conduct does not make it so. The poster is not conduct;
at the very least, it contains a large expressive element. The First Amendment
10

must apply. 1

When courts presumptively classify speech as conduct, they create a legal
fiction. The Supreme Court has rejected a similar fiction in another Title VII
context. To uphold various fetal protection policies, some circuit courts have
applied the analysis for facially neutral company policies to facially discrimina-

Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984).
96. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,410-11 (1974)).
97. Id. at 405.
98. Id. at 397 (flag burning); Tinker v. DeMoines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969) (wearing of arm bands); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S 367 (1968) (burning of
a draft card); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (cross burning); Loper v. New
York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (begging), aff'd, 99 F.2d 699 (2d
Cir. 1993); Hernandez v. Superintendent, Fredricksburg-RappahanockJoint Sec. Ctr., 800 F.
Supp. 1344 (E.D. Va. 1992) (wearing a mask).
99. See United States v. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d 1285, 1296 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994); see also supra notes 28-32 and
accompanying text.
100. Cf. Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 884 n.89 (1993) ("Title VII may
legitimately proscribe conduct, including undirected expressions of gender intolerance which
create an offensive working environment. That expression is 'swept up' in this proscription does
not violate First Amendment principles." (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538,
2546 (1992)).
101. See Baliko v. Stecker, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 899, 903 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1994) ("In light of R.A.
... , the question must be addressed whether the [antidiscrimination law] can constitutionally be interpreted as punishing speech which is bigoted and
sexually, racially, or religiusly offensive if that speech is unaccompaniedby illegal, non-verbal
conduct. ") (emphasis added); LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra, note 12, at 598 ("Although
workplace pornography might resemble conduct in its power to interfere with a women's job
performance, the fact remains that displaying pornographic pictures is expression, particularly
if it is intended to offend and demean female co-workers.").
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tory policies." °u The distinction allowed the courts to apply a more lenient
employer defense."0 3 The Supreme Court rejected the fiction."°
B. Will United States v. O'Brien Apply
in Hostile Environment Cases?
In Texas v. Johnson0 5 Justice Brennan provided a framework to
evaluate laws that regulate expressive conduct. The analysis contains two
threshold questions. A court must first decide if the conduct is expressive.106 Then, if expressive elements exist, the court must analyze the
government's basis for regulation. The state receives the benefit of "[United
States v.] O'Brien's relatively lenient standard ... [in] those cases in which
'the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.'""
The hostile environment doctrine will not always satisfy these threshold
requirements. Like the bigoted political poster, much discriminatory behavior
consists of speech alone. Employees who claim harassment must show that
the speech was not speech, but expressive conduct. 108
The requirement for no express governmental interest in the suppression
of speech also presents a roadblock. Title VII's expressed goal, the creation
of a discrimination-free workplace, facially shows no interest in the suppression of free speech."t 9 Nonetheless, difficulties arise if the discriminatory
conduct expresses the harasser's ideas and beliefs. To address the discrimination, the state must then attack expression.110 This shift in focus strongly
102. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), rev'd, 499
U.S. 187 (1991). But see Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1547-54 (11th Cir.
1984) (setting out and applying the facially neutral analysis, but concluding that the employer's
policy was facially discriminatory and affirming the damages awarded to the employee).
103. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198 (stating that the business necessity defense is more
lenient than the statutory BFOQ, bona fide occupational qualification, defense).
104. See id. at 198-200.
105. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
106. See id. at 403.
107. Id. at 407 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)) (citation
omitted).
108. Certain facts might support such an argument: Was the speaker a coworker with some
control over the plaintiff? Was the frequency of the message intolerable? Did the speaker
intentionally direct the dialogue toward the plaintiff? Did the plaintiff have an opportunity to
avoid the speech? Was the speaker browbeating the plaintiff?
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). A counterargument exists. To
"discriminate" is "to act on the on the basis of prejudice." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 376 (1976). "To act," however, is to "do something."
Id. at 13. "Something" obviously includes expressing a point of view. See id. at 1231. Thus,
"discriminate" implies expressing beliefs. Therefore, by prohibiting expressions of belief, Title
VII is facially discriminatory and interested in the suppression of expression.
110. Cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1301 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (Gibson, J.,
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suggests that the hostile environment doctrine relates to the suppression of free
expression. When a governmental interest in suppression exists, the analysis
is "outside of O'Brien's test altogether,""' and "[the Court] must therefore
subject the State's asserted interest . . . to 'the most exacting scrutiny.'" 112
Courts differ drastically on whether a governmental interest exists. Two
recent non-Title VII racial discrimination cases illustrate the problem. Faced
with almost identical facts and statutes, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits
reached diametrically opposed conclusions on whether the government
intended to suppress speech. 13 Each court initially noted that crossburning
was expressive conduct. 14 The courts then asked if O'Brien applied to the
crossburnings." s One court found a governmental interest in suppression, 6 while the other court did not." 7 The court finding no interest
applied O'Brien and upheld a criminal conviction."' The court that found
a governmental interest refused to apply O'Brien and overturned the
appellant's conviction.119
Sometimes, though, proof of a governmental interest in the suppression
of ideas presents no problem. The judges themselves provide the evidence:
"By informing people that the expression of racist or sexist attitudes in public
is unacceptable, people may eventually learn that such views are undesirable
in private, as well. Thus, Title VII may advance the goal of eliminating
prejudices and biases in our society."2' The jurists ignore an important
distinction. Benign education provided by the government does not censor
opposing viewpoints; Title VII's coercive liability does.'

concurring) ("The statute [18 U.S.C. § 241] as written is broad, but as targeted toward Lee, it
relies on the subjective reactions of [the victims] . . . . [W]e cannot say that, under the
circumstances before us, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression." (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1550 (1994)).
111. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410.
112. Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
113. Compare United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1369 (1994) with Lee, 6 F.3d at 1297 (Gibson, J., concurring). Lee's per curiam opinion
reversed the circuit's earlier affirmance of Lee's conviction and remanded the case for retrial in
accordance with Judge Gibson's concurrence. Id.
114. See Hayward, 6. F.3d at 1249-50; Lee, 6 F.3d at 1300.
115. See Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1250; Lee, 6 F.3d at 1301.
116. See Lee, 6 F.3d at 1301.
117. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251.
118. Id. at 1250-52.
119. Lee, 6 F.3d at 1301, 1304.
120. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Davis v.
Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989)).
121. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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If the initial requirements are satisfied, the expressive conduct test of
United States v. O'Brien" controls. The regulation must be "within the
constitutional power of the Government;" the law must further "an important
or substantial governmental interest;" and "the incidental restriction on alleged
freedoms" must be no greater than essential in furthering
First Amendment
3
that interest.1
Passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Title VII is within the
constitutional power of the government. 24 The eradication of sex discrimination in the workplace probably presents not only a substantial government
interest, but possibly a compelling one."
The hostile environment doctrine does not narrowly restrict speech. The
Harris standard causes the problem. Hostile environments are created by
something more than merely offensive conduct. 26 But the line between
merely offensive speech and something more than merely offensive speech is
not a line at all."2 As a result, employers probably will overreact to quell
merely offensive speech.
C. Title VII as Viewpoint Discrimination
The hostile environment theory probably is a viewpoint-based regulation
of speech. The bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment provides
"that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
12 Generally,
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. "
"the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that
favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others."' 29
Title VII sends the message that discrimination because of race, color,
30
The hostile environment
religion, sex, or national origin is unacceptable.

122. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
123. Id. at 377.
124. Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1964)
(discussing Title II).
125. Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) ("Minnesota'scompelling
interest in eradicating [sex discrimination] justifies the impact ... of the statute. . . ."). But
cf. Dayton Christian Sch. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932, 954 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding that although the state's interest was compelling, the state was "not constitutionally
compelled to enact the statute at issue"), rev'd on other grounds, 477 U.S. 619, 628 (1986)
(characterizing the state's interest as "sufficiently important").
126. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
127. See id. at 371 (1993) (providing a totality of circumstances test to determine if the work
environment was abusive).
128. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (citations omitted).
129. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (citations
omitted).
130. See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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theory broadcasts an additional view: The government will not tolerate
expressions of negative stereotypes. Title VII prohibits negative comments
toward men or women based on gender, but allows positive expressions.
However, many workers retain negative, bigoted viewpoints. The hostile
environment doctrine imposes liability on the employer who permits the
expression of those views. The threat of liability forces employers to stifle
workplace speech. Thus, Title VII suppresses views disfavored by the
majority.
One commentator has argued that the hostile environment theory is
viewpoint neutral:
[A]ny regulation that references speech or verbal conduct inspires the
appearance of censorship. However, Title VII focuses on the result of
verbal conduct, not on the message ....

Title VII ...

dictate[s] only the

impermissible result; the message is irrelevant. Consequently, Title VII
• . . [does] not operate to regulate viewpoints or censor communica-

tion.13
This reasoning goes too far when it claims that Title VII's lack of viewpoint
suppression equates with a lack of censorship. The logic ignores the
requirement for content neutrality.
D. Is the Hostile Environment Doctrine
a Content-BasedRegulation of Speech?
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul32 the Supreme Court classified Title VII
as a content-based statute regulating conduct, not speech.13 Less than a
3
year later, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,1
1 the Court classified Title VII as a
3
5
content-neutral statute.
The difference in classification is critical. The
presence or absence of content neutrality in a statute often determines whether
a given First Amendment doctrine applies.
Title VII is a facially contentbased law. A statute is content based if it regulates, not on the view espoused,
but on the subject addressed. 136 If the government "'must necessarily
examine the content of the message that is conveyed'" before applying a

131. Ellen E. Lange, Note, Racist Speech on Campus: A Title VII Solution to a First
Amendment Problem, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 105, 132-33 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
132. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
133. See id. at 2546.
134. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
135. See id. at 2200.
136. See St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2538 (1992) (invalidating prohibition of fighting words
addressing race, religion, sex); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (striking down viewpointneutral, but content-based, prohibition of speech against foreign governments).
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regulation, the law is not content-neutral. 37 A content-based regulation is
presumptively invalid. 3 Title VII does not regulate all harassment. The
statute only prohibits discrimination against a protected classification. 39
Thus, the statute forces the government to focus on the content of speech to
decide if the statute applies.
Although facially content based, Title VII could still be content-neutral.
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc." Chief Justice Rehnquist
confronted a facially content-based regulation. The Court analyzed Renton's
statute under the "time, place, and manner" doctrine."' The doctrine does
not apply to content-based regulations. 42 The Chief Justice solved the
dilemma with a legal fiction.'43 He held that a facially content-based statute
directed at the secondary effects of speech was cohtent neutral.'"4 Thus, the
time, 5 place, and manner doctrine applied, and the Court upheld the stat4
ute.
Notwithstanding Renton and the Title VII dicta in Mitchell, the hostile
environment theory is not content neutral. 146 In Boos v. Barry'47 the
Supreme Court clarified Renton, and said, "Regulations that focus on the
direct impact of speech on its audience present a different situation. Listeners'
reactions to speech are not the type of 'secondary effects' we referred to in
Renton. "148
The hostile environment standard inherently focuses on the emotive
impact of speech. Sexist expressions may cause a hostile environment as

137. See Forsyth County, Ga. v. NationalistMovement, 112 S. Ct. 2395,2403 (1992) (holding
as impermissible the content-based discretion given the administrator to set a fee for public
demonstration where the discretion was based on the expected impact of the demonstration)
(quoting Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987)); see also,
Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 230 (1987) (striking down a newspaper tax determined
by the content of the paper); FCC v. League of women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984)
(invalidating state statute regulating public television and radio editorials because applying the
regulation required a governmental determination of content).
138. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2542 (citations omitted).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
140. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
141. Id. at 46.
142. See id. at 46-47.
143. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
144. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 ("mhe Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our
definition of 'content-neutral' speech regulations. .. .
145. Id. at 54-55.
146. Cf. Johnsonv. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(holding that policy that banned only sexually oriented magazines was "undoubtedly content
based").
147. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
148. Id. at 321.
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readily as a demand for sex. 149 But the violation of Title VII does not occur
when the sexist remark is made. The violation occurs when the expression
harms the listener; 5 ' thus, the test must focus on the victim's reactions.
E. Does the Hostile Environment Theory Satisfy St. Paul?
As a content-based regulation of speech, the hostile environment doctrine
is presumptively invalid.'
However, in St. Paul the Court recognized
exceptions that allow content-based regulations of speech in some circumstances. 52 Justice Scalia stated in dicta that Title VII, as a statute directed at
conduct, would satisfy an exception.' 53 The remaining question is whether
the hostile environment doctrine satisfies a St. Paulexception, especially when
54
the doctrine is directed toward pure speech.
In St. Paul the Supreme Court revisited the content-neutrality doctrine.
The regulation in dispute prohibited the expression of "'fighting words that
insult or provoke violence,' on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender."'" The Court held that the ordinance regulated the content of
speech and was, thus, invalid. 56 While the government can regulate
fighting words, the government cannot regulate subsets of fighting words on
the basis of content. 157
Justice Scalia provided exceptions to the general rule against content-based
discrimination. The hostile environment theory may not satisfy any of them.
First, the basis for regulating a subset of prohibited speech may be the very
reason for proscribing the entire class of speech; if so, the First Amendment

149. Compare Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) with Meritor Say.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
150. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (1993) (affirming the use of objective and subjective tests for

harm).
151. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992).
152. Id. at 2543-46.
153. See id. at 2546.
154. Baliko v. Stecker, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 899,903 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1994) (requiring trial court to address claim that pure speech created a hostile environment "[i]n
light of R.A.V. "). Too much reliance on St. Paul's Title VII dicta to salvage the hostile
environment theory would be unwise. The characterization saves the statute as a whole from
invalidation; however, unconstitutionalapplications of the hostile environment are most likely fair
game. Cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (leaving intact federal
antidiscrimination law, but striking down an unconstitutional application of the statute to a given
defendant), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1550 (1994).
155. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
156. See id. at 2550.
157. See id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring) (concluding that the regulation questioned in St.
Paulis unconstitutionally overbroad). The government may regulate obscenity; the government
cannot, however, choose to regulate only obscenity espousing political ideas. See id. at 2555-56.
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will not protect the subclass. 5 8 Thus, a state may prohibit "obscenity which
is the most patently offensive in its prurience."159 This exception would not
apply in a hostile environment case unless the employers or coworkers
expressed their sexist views as obscenities or fighting words. Even if the
speech did contain fighting words or obscenities, the government could not
justify Title VII on a same-basis reason.
Second, content discrimination is valid if the regulation is aimed at the
secondary effects associated with the subclass of speech."6 The hostile
environment theory will not satisfy the secondary effects exception nor will

any regulation that focuses on the emotive impact of speech.'
The final exception provides that "since words can in some circumstances
violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct . . . speech can
be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather
than speech."62 Justice Scalia declared that Title VII met the "aimed at
conduct" exception:
"Thus, for example, sexually derogatory 'fighting
words,' among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general
prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices." 63

158. Id. at 2545-46.

159. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2546 (emphasis added); cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 2324 (1973) (defining obscenity as appealing to the prurient interest, portraying "sexual conduct in
a patently offensive way," and, failing to have a "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value" when taken as a whole). A nudist right's party might distribute obscene political flyers.
The government could proscribe the group's obscenity because it contained extremely prurient
material. However, if the political content of the obscenity provoked the regulation, the
government would not satisfy the same-basis exception.
160. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2546. Compare Chief Justice Rehnquist's treatment of the
secondary effects exception in Renton with Justice Scalia's approach in St. Paul. Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that if a facially content-based regulation attempts to regulate a secondary
effect, no content-based regulation exists. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 ("Renton['s] ordinance is
completely consistent with our definition of 'content-neutral' speech regulations. . .

.").

Justice

Scalia probably concedes that Renton's regulation is content discriminatory, but supports the
Renton holding with an exception. See St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2549. Similarly, Scalia classified
Title VII as a valid content-based statute. See id. at 2546.
161. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
162. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2546 (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 2546 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 242; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 2000e-2; 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604. 11 (1991)). The Title VII discussion in St. Paul could limit the scope of the hostile
environment. When Justice Scalia wrote, "sexually derogatory 'fighting words,' among other
words, may produce a violation of [Title VII]," Id. at 2546, Scalia implied that he would only
allow the proscription of sexually derogatory language that also constitutes fighting words. This
interpretation recently surfaced in a non-Title VII racial discrimination case. See United States
v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1302 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (Gibson, J., concurring) (citing St. Paul,
112 S. Ct. at 2546-47, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1550 (1994).
Another interpretation exists. Justice Scalia did not just say "fighting words;" he said
"fighting words, among other words." St. Paul, 112"S. Ct. at 2546 (emphasis added). Thus,
the aimed at conduct exception may allow the proscriptionof a larger category of speech than just
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Justice White pointed out that the majority opinion "glosse[d] over the...
regulation governing hostile working environment, which reaches beyond any
'incidental' effect on speech."'"'
Justice White is correct."~ The hostile environment theory does not
always neatly satisfy the exception. The awkwardness of the fit is amplified
when government attacks conduct that expresses a belief or a point of view.
In Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpentersand JoinersLocal Union No. 600'6 the
views expressed by the union calendar constituted the only conduct found to
create a hostile environment.167 The court's injunction effectively prevented
the union from expressing itself. 61 Therefore, speech was not incidentally
suppressed; it was the only thing suppressed.
The "aimed at conduct" exception already has surfaced in a hostile
environment case. The District Court of Minnesota, in Jenson v. Eveleth
Taconite Co.,169 used the exception to reject an employer's First Amendment
defense. 7 ' The plaintiffs offered as evidence the stereotypical views held
by male employees.17 1 The employer asserted that the First Amendment
prevents Title VII from regulating bigoted speech without some showing of
conduct toward an individual. The court disposed of the issue by defining the
expression of bias as proscribable behavior when it occurs in the workplace,
where Title VII applies. 7

fighting words.
164. 112 S. Ct. at 2557 (White, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 376 (1968)).
165. Justice White believes that the secondary effects exception includes the aimed at conduct
exception. See id. at 2556-58 (White, J., concurring); see also Lee, 6 F.3d at 1301-03 (Gibson,
J., concurring) (citing St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2546). Justice Scalia also analyzed the exceptions
as listed by Justice White. See St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2548-2549. Notwithstanding, Boos v.
Barry demonstrates that the secondary-effectsexception cannot apply when the regulation focuses
on the emotive impact of the speech. See 485 U.S. 312 (1988). Regulation of expression with
the potential for creating a hostile environment is predicated on precisely that. Thus, a hostile
environment Title VII claim does not fit into the secondary-effect exception. Therefore, the
aimed at conduct exceptionprobably stands alone. If however, as Justice White suggests, the two
exceptions are not distinct, there may be yet another explanation. Possibly, the Court attempted
to show that the hostile-environment theory is suspect when the First Amendment is an issue.
See supra note 163.
166. 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,602 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, No. 93-1738 (3d Cir. Nov.
7, 1994).
167. See id. at 19 ("The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving
pornographic materials is 'implicit' and courts should recognize this 'as a matter of course.'")
(quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990).
168. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
169. 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993).
170. Id. at 884 n.89.
171. Id. at 880-84.
172. Id. at 884 n.89.
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The court's discussing of First Amendment concerns was conclusory at
best: "Title VII may legitimately proscribe conduct, including undirected
expressions of gender intolerance, which create an offensive working
environment. That expression is 'swept up' in this proscription does not
violate First Amendment principles."17 If the conduct consists primarily of
speech and the speech expresses a viewpoint, the hostile environment theory
does not sweep up anything except the speech itself-and, perhaps, the First
Amendment as well.
F. Time, Place, and Manner Regulation
If a court classifies the hostile environment doctrine as content neutral,
then the time, place, and manner doctrine would apply. The government may
impose reasonable limits on the time, place, and manner of protected speech
under certain conditions. 74 First, the state must justify the restriction
without reference to the content of the speech. Second, the government must
narrowly tailor the regulation "to serve a significant governmental interest."'7 Finally, the government must "leave open ample alternate channels
for communication."176 Developed for restrictions on speech in public
forums," 7 the doctrine also. applies to speech occurring on private property. 178

The "narrowly tailored" element does not require the government to
choose the least restrictive means of accomplishing its purpose. 179 As a
result, employers cannot defeat a time, place, and manner regulation by
proposing alternate regulations that are less intrusive.

173. Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992)). But cf. Baliko
v. Stecker 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 899, 903 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)
(directing trial court to determine if St. Paul prevents proscription of hostile environment claims
based on pure speech).
174. E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989); Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
175. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
176. Id. (citing Members of City Council v. Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37
(1983); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)).
177. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 790-91.
178. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991); City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
179. Ward, 491 U.S. at 800. Thus, the government is not required to prove that no alternative
is better than its choice.
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Ample alternate channels of communication might not exist. Working
America spends much of each day on the job. Moreover, hostile environment
liability can possibly accrue for views expressed outside the workplace. 80
The court in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards' held that the time,
place, and manner doctrine justified speech restrictions caused by the hostile
environment theory. The court ignored the content-neutrality requirement:
"To the extent that the regulation here does not seem entirely content neutral,
the distinction based on the sexually explicit nature of the pictures and other
speech does not offend constitutional principles. " Im
This treatment
implicitly holds that workplace speech deserves less protection than other
83
speech.1
G. The Captive Audience Doctrine
The captive audience doctrine provides a compelling argument in favor
of workplace speech regulation. An audience that cannot turn off its speaker
is "captive."s 4 The government may prohibit offensive speech when the
captive audience cannot avoid the speech." s
The doctrine requires a
substantial invasion of a, privacy interest that occurs "in an essentially
intolerable manner."'8 6
The hostile environment theory might satisfy the substantial invasion of
privacy contemplated by the captive audience doctrine. The rule in Harris
requires an abusive environment before establishing liability. For an abusive
environment to exist, the plaintiff must show more than mere offense.'1 A
court might find that the Harris level of harm is substantial enough. In
addition, one's sex is often closely related to one's sense of self. Thus, an

180. Cf. Poffv. Oaktree Mortgage Corp., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1562 (E.D. La.
1993) (holding an employer potentially liable for a joke told after working hours at a local
restaurant).
181. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
182. Id. at 1535 (citing Reuton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Case R. Sunstein,
Pornographyand the FirstAmendment, 1986 DUKE L. J. 589).
183. Professor Browne contends that this attitude comes from the generally low esteem given
workplace speech because of its "working class" character. Browne, supra note 71; cf.
Lindemann & Kadue, supra note 12, at 600 ("From a First Amendment standpoint, there is a
very important difference between the college campus and the workplace: The primary purpose
of a college ... is learning through the explanation of ideas. Although the exploration of ideas
is not always foreign to the workplace, that is not its primary purpose."). The basis of the
distinction for workplace speech is not clear. Academia does not monopolize political discussion.
A work force not discussing the political issues of the day would be rare indeed.
184. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988).
185. Id.
186. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
187. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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environment that abuses an employee because of sex arguably commits an
invasion of privacy.
Nevertheless, the captive audience doctrine is not broadly applied.
Laurence Tribe cautions that the idea of a captive audience "is dangerously
encompassing." 188 He further contends that "the Court has properly been
reluctant to [find a captive audience] whenever a regulation is not contentneutral."189 More, not less, constitutional protection is needed for speech the
majority finds offensive. 1" The Court often mentions potential captive
audiences,' 91 but generally will apply the doctrine only to persons captive in
their homes. "
In addition, not all employees are captive. Many employment settings
exist. A per se employee-as-captive rule likely would protect some employees
who need no protection. But this logic cuts both ways. Just as some
employees are not captive, others probably are. 1' Many employees work
under strict controls, with no freedom of movement. These employees cannot
avoid unwanted speech and, thus, belong to a captive audience.
H. Public Employees and the Hostile Environment
Hostile environments can occur in public and private workplaces. If a
public employee creates a hostile environment with speech, presumably the
government would restrict the speech. If the employee alleges a First
Amendment violation, the "public employee speech" doctrine will apply. The.
doctrine balances two competing interests: "the employee's interest, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the [state's
interest], as an employer," in providing efficient public services. 194
The public employee speech doctrine allows the state to limit a wide range
of speech. First, the doctrine only protects the employee's interest in speech

188. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 12-19, at 950 n.24 (2d ed.

1988).
189. Id. (citing Eroznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)).
190. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978).
191. See, e.g., Eroznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 828 (1975); Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556
(1975); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21; NLRB v. United Steel Workers, 357 U.S. 357, 368 (1958)
(Warren, C.J., dissenting) ("Employees during working hours are the classic captive audience.");
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S 290, 298 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (characterizingpedestrians
as captive audience).
192. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 474; Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749 n.27; CBS v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127-28 (1973).
193. Cf. UnitedSteel Workers, 357 U.S. at 368 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) ("Employees during
working hours are the classic captive audience.").
194. Id. at 384 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
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of a public concern, a smaller subset of speech than that normally receiving
First Amendment protection. Second, courts must consider the content and the
time, place, and manner of the speech. 9956 Finally, the employee's relative
position in the organization is important.
Under the doctrine, the courts will allow the government to suppress
sexually harassing speech. Most harassing speech does not address matters of
a public concern. Requests for sex, gross jokes, and comments on female
anatomy do not qualify. Even if the harassing employee addresses a matter
of public concern, and does so in a severe enough manner, the courts likely
will defer to the governmental desire to maintain an efficient workplace. 19
The judge in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyard98 used the public
employee speech doctrine to justify governmental regulation of private
employee speech. The court recognized that the public employee speech cases
"lend a supportive analogy. " 199 The court conceptualized its decree "as a
governmental directive concerning workplace rules that an employer must
carry out."'
The court, with no justification other than the analogy,
asserted, "[T]he present inquiry is informed by the limits of a governmental
employer's power to enforce workplace rules impinging on free speech
rights. "201
The court's reasoning is problematic. First, the case cited as analogous,
McMullen v. Carson,2° does not address the government's power to
interfere in a private workplace. In McMullen the court did not direct a
private employer to suppress workplace speech. The court merely acquiesced
in the government's firing of an employee who expressed disruptive views as
a recruiter for the KKK.'
Even if one assumes that the court directed the
government to suppress the views, the analogy fails. The judge is a
governmental official, and his acts are the acts of the state.2 ' Thus, if a
court imposes hostile environment liability on the government, the state is just

195. Id. at 385, 388 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-53; Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979)).
196. Id. at 390 ("[Slome attention must be paid to the responsibilities of the employee within
the agency.").
197. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 138.
198. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
199. Id. at 1536.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 568 F. Supp. 937, 943-45 (M.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd, 754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985); see
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1536.
203. McMullen, 568 F. Supp. at 945.
204. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
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telling itself what to do." 5 The Constitution was not created to protect the
government from the government.
Second, application of the doctrine to the private sector without
justification presumes that the government can dictate the morale and
efficiency of the private workplace. That presumption should require
independent constitutional justification. The courts created the doctrine to
allow the government to act like a private employer,' not to interfere with
private enterprise.
Finally, if a court mandates that an employer adopt the government's
workplace standards, the government forces the employer to acquiesce to a
view the employer may dislike. This action potentially violates the employer's
First Amendment right not to speak.'
Thus, the public employee speech doctrine fails as an independent
justification for the hostile environment's regulation of workplace speech. But
the doctrine still can assist the debate. The courts eventually might affirm
some governmental control over speech in the private workplace. One hopes
the courts will attempt to protect speech near the heart of the First Amendment.
The public concern element of the public employee speech doctrine could
provide the needed security."' The Supreme Court has "recognized that not
all speech is of equal First Amendment importance."'
"[S]peech on
'matters of public concern'" lies "'at the heart of the First Amendment's
protection.'"21 The First Amendment fundamentally guarantees "the free
flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern," 211 and
political speech demands the highest degree of First Amendment protection.2" The courts could draw on already established public concern
principles.213
205. Cf. McMullen, 568 F. Supp. at 944 (upholding a sheriff's decision to protect the
credibility of his office by firing an employee who was also a KKK recruiter).
206. Cf. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) ("This balancing is necessary to
accommodate the dual role of the public employer as a provider of public services and as a
government entity operating under the constraints of the First Amendment.").
207. Cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("Mhe right of freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and
the right to refrain from speaking at all." (citing West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943)); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641 ("Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only
the unanimity of the graveyard.").
208. Cf. Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dep't, 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(holding that "reading of Playboy amounts to expression relating to matters of public concern").
209. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,758 (1985) (footnote
omitted).
210. Id. at 758-59 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
211. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S 46, 50 (1988).
212. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S 312, 321 (1988).
213. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
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Under this standard, the private workplace would remain open to political
discussions. Some forms of political speech probably would create a hostile
environment. However, because political speech addresses a matter of public
concern, the court could not attach liability.
For the public concern standard to protect political speech, courts must
avoid using the public employee speech balance. If the balancing occurred,
a court might attempt to weigh the balance in favor of the government's view
of workplace efficiency over the interest in expressing views of a public
concern. Speech would then receive less protection.
L The Impact of Harris on the FirstAmendment Analysis
In Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc.2" 4 the Supreme Court did not address
a First Amendment issue. Nevertheless, the Court adopted a hostile-environment standard that will affect the First Amendment. In addition, Harris's
impact is magnified when viewed in context with the jury trials and punitive
damages now available under Title VII.21 5
As the level of harm required to create an actionable hostile environment
lowers, the potential for conflict between the hostile environment theory and
the First Amendment rises. Barbara Lindemann and David Kadue implicitly
acknowledge this nexus between the two doctrines. They propose that courts
generally require high levels of outrageous conduct. The authors then suggest
that the higher level effectively incorporates most First Amendment concerns.

216

Harrisand the Civil Rights Act of 1991217 combine to severely weaken
Lindemann and Kadue's position. First, the authors based their argument on
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co..218 The Rabidue court developed the severe
psychological injury standard expressly rejected by Harris. 9 Second, even
with slight evidence of a hostile environment, some judges refuse to grant
summary judgment.'
Third, with jury trials now available in Title VII

(1983); cf. Dun & Bradstreet,472 U.S. at 759 (using the Connick definition of speech of public
concern in a defamation action).
214. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
215. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. III 1991).
216. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 12, at 594.
217. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1072 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42

U.S.C.).
218. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
219. Lindemann & Kadue, supra note 12, at 594 n.154; see Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71.
220. In Poff v. Oak Tree Mortgage Co., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1562 (E.D. La.
1993), the plaintiff, a loan officer for the defendant employer, complained that the company
president created a hostile environment by telling a risque joke at a dinner party celebrating the
plaintiff's new promotion. The president used the plaintiff's name in telling the joke. Id. The
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cases," 2 judges may defer more marginal cases to the jury. Finally, the
recent ability of plaintiffs to claim punitive damages m may increase the
number of borderline claims and thus foster more conflicts between Title VII
and the First Amendment. Similarly, the ambiguity of the Harris standard of
liability might cause more litigation, further bringing the two bodies of law
into conflict.
V. CONCLUSION

This Note attempts to illustrate a few of the potential First Amendment
issues raised by Title VII's proscription of a hostile environment. Under Title
VII workers have a right to a workplace free from harassing conduct. In
protecting a worker's right, Title VII proscribes speech creating a hostile
environment. However, any governmental suppression of speech requires a
firm constitutional basis. Unfortunately, hostile environment law developed
with no First Amendment review.
With the merely offensive standard of Harris v. Forklift Systemst the
Supreme Court chose a rule that bodes ill for the First Amendment. The low
level of harm required for liability and the uncertainty of the standard will
cause an increase in First Amendment conflicts. Any standard expressed as
greater than mere offensiveness but less than severe psychological damage
leaves much to be desired. 4
Title VII coercively suppresses workplace speech. Thus, employers have
standing to argue a First Amendment defense. The same coercion probably
allows employees with suppressed speech to show state action and, thus, allege
a First Amendment violation by their employer.
Even when courts acknowledge the First Amendment, they proceed by
classifying pure speech and expressive conduct as proscribable conduct. Such
treatment deadens the free speech debate before it begins.
If the discriminatory speech is expressive conduct and if the government
has no interest in suppressing speech, the less stringent O'Brien analysis will
apply. However, the analysis for the governmental interest is complex, a
situation aggravated if the conduct at issue expresses beliefs or opinions.

court refused summary judgement, holding that the trier of fact could find a hostile environment
was created by the telling of one joke. Id. at 1563. But cf., Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that one off-color joke and a conversation about a strip bar is not enough to
state a hostile environment claim), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1054 (1994).
221. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. III 1991).

222. See id. § 1981a(b).
223. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
224. Cf. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that test provided "adds little certitude" and opens "more expansive vistas of litigation").
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St. Paul's content-discrimination standard may provide the proper First
Amendment analysis. However, even though Justice Scalia said that Title VII
met the aimed at conduct exception, the hostile environment theory does not
fit neatly into that, or any other, exception.
The time, place, and manner doctrine is not an easy fix for the First
Amendment problem. Notwithstanding the Title VII dicta in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 15 the hostile environment standard is a content-based regulation of
speech.
The captive audience doctrine may provide a solution to the workplace
speech dilemma. A strong argument exists for applying the doctrine when
employees have no control over the speech they receive.
Commentators have cited Title VII as precedent to justify other governmental speech regulations.2 ' 6 Unfortunately, this trend has occurred before
Title VII and the hostile environment have received adequate First Amendment
review. In light of America's strong commitment to free speech, the hostile
environment doctrine desperately needs that scrutiny.

225. 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2200 (1993).
226. Cf. Cynthia G. Bowman, Street Harassmentand the Informal Ghettoization of Women,
106 HARv. L. REv. 517 (1993) (suggesting criminal sanctions for expressions derogatory to
women spoken on the street); Lange, supra note 131 (positing Title VII as a viable ideological
model for the regulation of campus speech).
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